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JUDICIAL PROCESS AS AN EMPIRICAL STUDY:
A COMMENT ON JUSTICE BRENNAN'S
ESSAY
Charles M. Yablon*

I.

LOOKING AT WHAT JUDGES ACTUALLY DO

One of the enduring accomplishments of the Legal Realist move
ment was to shift at least some of the attention of academic lawyers
away from their favorite occupation—telling judges what to do—and
to get them to consider what it is that judges actually do. The genera
tion of legal scholars who immediately preceded the Realists had at
tacked the formalism of judicial decisionmaking, criticizing judges for
mechanically applying formal rules without considering social needs
or public policy.' The Realists, while sympathetic to this prescriptive
claim about the proper role of judges, added to it a descriptive claim,
that judges did not in fact decide cases through mechanical applica
tion of general rules, that such formal rules were indeterminate at the
level of practice, and did not yield certainty or predictable results.^
Certainty and predictability, to the extent they existed in the legal
system, were the product of the "personality of the judge," not the
• Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. I am grate
ful to David Rudenstine for his thoughtful suggestions on an earlier draft of this piece, and to
Rick Antonoif for his careful and able research assistance.
1 For example, Roscoe Pound's prescriptivist claim charged the formalists with using
"mechanical" jurisprudence—empty words and meaningless deductions—achieving "unscien
tific" arbitrary results. He proposed a study of law using pragmatic scientific methodology to
achieve a "sociological" jurisprudence. See Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 Colum. L.
Rev. 605, 620-21 (1908). Joseph W. Bingham suggested that in order to examine what judges
do, we must look at the results of their judicial process; the decisions themselves. This ap
proach takes cause-and-effect analysis, as used in the natural sciences, grounding its conclu
sions on empirical evidence. See Bingham, What is the Law? (pts. 1 & 2), 11 Mich. L. Rev. 1,
11 Mich. L. Rev. 109 (1912). By moving the discourse into the science arena, these lawyers
sought to derive knowledge of the judicial process by using scientific models and philosophical
abstraction to provide a practical study of law that could resolve social problems.
2 See K.N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 4 (1960) ("men talk about contracts, and trusts,
and corporations, as if these things existed in themselves, instead of being the shadows cast
across the front stage by the movements of the courts unheeded in the rear"); Frank, What
Courts Do In Fact, 26 111. L. Rev. 645, 648-51 (1932).
It is therefore by no means certain that the court will leam the truth even about
cases involving the simplest facts. And unless that is certain, then you cannot be at
all sure, before the court has heard the case, what the decision will be. Not even if
the rules were clear, definite and precise.
Id. at 650.

149

150

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:149

formal rule structure.^
Others came forward to argue that the Realist position, if not
wrong, was at least highly exaggerated. They argued that judges did
indeed rely on formal rules in reaching decisions and that the areas of
judicial freedom or creativity were, at best, rather circumscribed.^
Thus, for at least the last sixty years or so, the question of how
judges actually decide cases has been a respectable academic question,
and one that has engendered considerable academic debate. Some
scholars have carefully observed, collected, and collated judicial be
havior.' Others have conducted thought experiments involving a
judge of superhuman intelUgence and knowledge, in the hope that
describing how such a judge would decide cases can clarify the deci
sionmaking processes of real judges.® Yet other legal scholars have
sought to describe in great detail how they would go about deciding
cases if they were judges.^
Amidst all this observing, theorizing, and describing, of course, a
fairly obvious question emerges. Why not ask the judges? After all,
seeking to describe what judges do is not like trying to describe the
religious practices of the Etruscans or the migration routes of wild
3 Having served eleven years as a judge, Hutcheson described the process of deciding the
difficult case, saying
I, after canvassing all the available material at my command, and duly cogitating
upon it, give my imagination play, and brooding over the cause, wait for the feel
ing, the hunch—that intuitive flash of understanding which makes the jump-spark
connection between question and decision, and at the point where the path is
darkest for the judicial feet, sheds its light along the way.
Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14
Cornell L.Q. 274, 278 (1929). Hutcheson made this confession confident that other judges,
too, decided cases intuitively. Id. See also Frank, supra note 2, at 655 (combination of judge's
personality and innumerable stimuli produce decisions).
* Hans Kelsen, for example, views the legal system as a hierarchy of norms, with rules at
any level traceable to norms at still higher levels, culminating in the "basic norm," which is the
premise of the entire system. See H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law 193-214 (1961). For Hart,
the system consists of primary and secondary rules. Primary rules are the informal rules by
which social existence is basically conditioned. When conditions change, these rules become
uncertain requiring clarification from the secondary rules; which are the rules of recognition,
rules of change, and rules of adjudication to determine "whether, on a particular occasion, a
primary rule has been broken." H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 94 (1961).
5
e.g., Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31
UCLA L. Rev. 4 (1983).
6 See R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 105-30 (1977).
See Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36
J. Legal Educ. 518 (1986). Professor Kennedy explores his own decisionmaking as he
imagines it would be if he were a judge deciding a case that, for him, "present[s] a conflict
between 'the law' and 'how-I-want-to-come-out.' " "The law" is the rule of law derived from
precedent that is "expected" to control the case; whereas "how-I-want-to-come-out," is simply
what it seems—Kennedy's personal preference as the outcome of the case. Id. at 518-20.
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geese. Judges are not a vanished race, nor are they particularly hard
to find. Moreover, they are highly intelligent and articulate people
who seem perfectly capable of explaining, in whatever degree of detail
is desired, what it is they do and how they go about doing it.
Accordingly, it is at least somewhat surprising that judges them
selves have not played a larger role in the academic debates about
what judges do and how judges decide cases. The great exception to
this generalization, of course, is Benjamin N. Cardozo, whose work,
particularly The Nature of the Judicial Process,^ had a major impact
on the study of judicial decisionmaking. But the paucity of judicial
writing on this subject since Cardozo is a matter that merits some
consideration.
Two possibilities seem to exhaust the field—either judges do not
want to tell us how they decide cases, or they are unable to do so.
Let's consider the latter, and seemingly more implausible possibility,
first. It seems difficult to believe that individuals whose job it is to
decide cases, who do so on an almost daily basis, and who are adept at
expressing the legal rationale underlying their opinions, should be un
able to tell us how it is they make such decisions. Yet it may not be as
implausible as all that, for reasons I hope to make clear below.
Let's first make sure we understand what we are asking these
judges to explain. We are not asking them to tell us the legal grounds
supporting their decision. Judges do that all the time in the opinions
themseilves. Moreover, such legal grounds are not hard for judges to
find. They are contained in the briefs of the parties submitted to the
court. In any competently lawyered case, a judge is likely to have,
before he or she makes any decision, at least two briefs that together
muster the strongest legal reasons that can be given for deciding the
case either way. The question we are really asking then, when we ask
how a judge decides a case, is how does a judge go about deciding
which legal arguments are stronger, or, put a slightly different way,
how does a judge decide which side deserves to win?
It is not at all implausible that a judge, even an extremely skillful
one, may not be able to articulate how he or she goes about deciding
cases in this sense. There are many types of knowledge that we pos
sess and are able to act upon, yet cannot be precisely articulated so as
to enable others to act upon them in the same way. Wittgenstein pro
vided a fine example when he asked: Do you know what a Haydn
symphony sounds like? Can you tell me?' The point, of course, is
that you may know very well what a Haydn symphony sounds like.
* B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921).
® See L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 143 (1958).

152

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:149

You may even be able to pick Haydn works out from those of Mozart
or early Beethoven. Yet it is unlikely that you can articulate for
someone without your level of training and knowledge what precisely
it is that you hear that enables you to distinguish Haydn from Mo
zart, and even more unlikely that you can instruct them how to do the
same thing.
It is very possible that deciding cases, in the sense we are speak
ing of it, is something like this. The trained judge may find it quite
easy in many cases to distinguish good arguments from bad, meritori
ous cases from frivolous ones, even when the formal structure of the
arguments appears quite similar. Yet it may be impossible for a judge
to articulate, in general terms, what makes a good argument good, a
bad argument bad. The judge may be forced to resort, like the Haydn
scholar, to examples. If we hear enough Haydn symphonies, and are
not completely tone deaf, it is conceivable that we will eventually
learn how to pick them out from other music. By the same token, if
we read enough good and bad legal arguments, (and are not com
pletely without rhetorical facility) we should eventually learn how to
pick out the ones we are told are "good." Indeed, it is hard to see
how contemporary law school pedagogy can be justified on any other
grounds.
Accordingly, we see that it is quite possible that judges cannot
tell us how they decide cases. In fact, some of the most interesting
jurisprudential writing from judges has come close to making such a
declaration. Hutcheson wrote eloquently of the role of the "hunch"
in judicial decisionmaking,'® and Cardozo too cautioned judges that
their intuition was often a truer guide to "correct" decisions than
analysis of doctrinal authority." But if in fact the nature of the judi
cial decisionmaking process cannot be articulated, it is certainly
within the power of judges to tell us that, and some indeed have.
This brings us to the second possibility, that judges do not want
either to tell us how they decide cases, or to confess that they cannot
articulate how they go about doing so. The reasons for this may be
entirely obvious and straightforward. Judges are busy people. They
are also, by and large, practical people, who confront, on a regular
basis, the manifestations of many of our most pressing social
problems. It is not surprising, therefore, that of the minority of
judges who choose to speak or write about the law in a nonjudicial
capacity, most choose legal topics of more immediate practical con
cern such as reform of the courts or the criminal justice system.
10 See Hutcheson, supra note 3, at 278.
11 Cardozo, supra note 8, at 113.

1988]

PROCESS AS AN EMPIRICAL STUDY

153

Yet one must also entertain the less obvious and more interesting
possibility that writing about decisionmaking, in the sense we have
been discussing it, may strike judges as inappropriate and perhaps
even unwise. I do not mean this simply from a careerist point of view,
although it is clear from recent events that extrajudicial writing can
be injurious to higher judicial aspirations.'^ Rather, I am concerned
with the more general and socially motivated claim that it is detri
mental to society or the rule of law itself for judges to talk too much
about how they decide cases. Even if one assumes that most people
know that judges do not simply decide cases mechanically on the ba
sis of preexisting rules, but rather have substantial choice in determin
ing outcomes, one can still question whether it is a good idea to
emphasize such judicial freedom and creativity. After all, the struc
ture of the legal process is still designed to give the appearance of a
formal process with a single right answer. Judges, by and large, still
write their opinions syllogistically, describing their decisions as the
formal application of controlling legal rules to particular facts. Law
yers still appeal from those decisions by ascribing legal "error" to the
opinion below. It would not be surprising if judges, used to speaking
and thinking in these terms, would be apprehensive about adopting a
mode of discourse that assumes a freedom and creativity their judicial
opinions seek to suppress.
These formal structures of determinacy still have real power, and
we do not know to what extent public respect for law and the courts is
tied up with them. For that reason, it is not at all inconsistent to
recognize that there exists substantial judicial freedom, yet not wish
to proclaim the fact too publicly. We have seen, therefore, that asking
a judge to explain how he or she decides cases is not an easy assign
ment. It requires serious insight and self-reflection on the part of the
judge and a willingness to try to express his or her actions in a manner
quite different from that of the judicial opinion. It requires a commit
ment of time and energy and, perhaps most importantly, a willingness
to break with traditional images of the judge's role, and a faith that
providing greater insight into what judges actually do will strengthen
public respect for the law and the judiciary.
These observations, to the extent they explain the relative paucity
of writing by judges about the judicial process, also help us appreciate
the value of the essay by Justice Brennan to which this symposium is
addressed. Judges rarely speak with so much frankness and insight
'2 See, e.g., Cillers, The Compelling Case Against Robert H. Bork, 9 Cardozo L. Rev. 33
(1987); Kurland, Bork: The Transformation of a Conservative Constitutionalist, 9 Cardozo L.
Rev. 127 (1987).
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about their role, and when they do we should take the opportunity to
learn from them. In the next section, I want to do precisely that, by
seeking to apply Justice Brennan's insights to an unresolved issue in
the writing on judicial process.
II.

Two VIEWS OF JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING

The question I want to explore involves two different accounts of
how judges make decisions when the case before them is not "con
trolled" by prior precedent or statutory language. Virtually all mod
ern commentators (and judges) agree that such cases exist, although
they disagree vigorously as to the extent to which they predominate in
the legal system. The notion of "controlling" precedent is itself part
of the problem, since no case ever repeats identically the fact situation
of a prior one, and no statutory language ever interprets itself. Hav
ing made that obligatory bow to the deconstructionists,'^ the fact re
mains that lawyers and judges are able to recognize many cases that
are "controlled" by statute or prior precedent, but it is not uncom
mon to read in many judicial opinions a declaration that the issue
presented by the case is one of "first impression," for which neither
prior cases, statutes, nor legislative history provide a dispositive an
swer. The question then is, what does the judge do in such
circumstances.
One answer, and a prominent one in the legal literature, is that a
judge in this situation is a lawmaker, a legislator, and what he or she
does is legislate. That is, once the judge determines that the law has
"run out," that preexisting legal rules provide no guidance for the
particular decision at hand, a judge's decisionmaking process is basi
cally the same as that of a legislator. She considers various legal rules
that might be adopted, examines the likely consequences of each in
light of her knowledge of American society, and chooses the one she
thinks "best" in terms of the broad panoply of considerations—social,
economic, political, and equitable—that go into any legislative
decision.
This assertion, that the decisionmaking process of the judge in
situations where the law has "run out" is essentially a legislative one,
can be found in a number of prominent commentators on the nature
of the judicial process. It is probably most closely associated with
Cardozo himself, who summarized with typical eloquence his view of
the similarities between the judicial and legislative role:
Each indeed is legislating within ,the limits of his competence. No
13 See Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 Yale L.J. 743 (1987).

1988]

PROCESS AS AN EMPIRICAL STUDY

155

doubt the limits for the judge are narrower. He legislates only be
tween gaps. He fills the open spaces in the law. . . . None the less,
within the confines of these open spaces and those of precedent and
tradition, choice moves with a freedom which stamps its action as
creative. The law which is the resulting product is not found, but
made. The process, being legislative, demands the legislator's wis
dom."
A similar \i0w was expressed by H.L.A. Hart, who, in The Con
cept of Law, noted that:
Here at the margin of rules and in the fields left open by the theory
of precedents, the courts perform a rule-producing function which
administrative bodies perform centrally in the elaboration of varia
ble standards. In a system where stare decisis is firmly acknowl
edged, this function of the courts is very like the exercise of
delegated rule-making powers by an administrative body.''
This account, which I call the "legislative" theory of judicial
decisionmaking, views the preexisting legal system as having a deter
minate scope. A legal question may either fall within that scope, in
which case the question is controlled by prior authority, or it does not
fall within the scope of preexisting legal rules. In such a case, the
"law" has nothing to say to a judge, who must, as Cardozo tells us,
exercise a "legislative wisdom" in promulgating a new rule best suited
to the needs of society. However, as Hart reminds us, these newly
produced rules themselves become a part of the "law," bringing more
legal questions within its determinate, but ever-expanding scope. For
our purposes, however, the key assertion of the legislative theory is its
claim that if a judge is presented with a novel legal question, one be
yond the scope of the preexisting rules, then the "law" is irrelevant to
that decision, just as it is irrelevant to a legislative decision. Conse
quently, in evaluating such a decision, one can speak of it as wise or
foolish, well or poorly tailored to the needs of society, but not as "law
ful" or "unlawful," or "correct" or "incorrect" in terms of the preex
isting "law."
The alternative account of judicial decisionmaking, which I call
"intuitionist," also recognizes that legal materials may fail to "con
trol" the specific legal issue presented, yet this theory denies that
under such circumstances, the judge simply legislates the best or most
useful rule. Rather, this theory claims that there is always "some
thing else," to which the judge can resort in reaching a decision. The
theory presupposes that there is some aspect of judicial decisionmakCardozo, supra note 8, at 113-15.
15 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 132 (1961).
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ing which renders it qualitatively diflFerent from legislative decisions,
even when the question presented is not "controlled" by any preexist
ing legal authority.
The various theorists I would lump together as "intuitionists" do
not agree as to what the "something else" is that judges bring to the
judicial decision. Frank wrote of the importance of the judge's
"hunch" as the determining factor in most litigated cases,'® and
Hutcheson extensively analyzed and extolled "the judgment intui
tive." The notion that there is a uniquely judicial quality of mind,
involving "openness" and "neutrality" is central to Hart and Sachs
account of the judicial process.'' The uniqueness of the judicial mode
of decisionmaking as a shared interpretive enterprise figures promi
nently in Ronald Dworkin's recent work.'®
While Dworkin, Hart and Sachs, and Frank are not usually
thought of as sharing a single legal philosophy, it is clear that on this
issue, they do share certain beliefs." The intuitionists would all claim
that the fact that one is acting as a judge constrains and limits one's
decisionmaking in ways legislators are not constrained. Judges must
always take the "law" into account, even when the case before them is
not controlled by prior authority. Accordingly, their decisions may
be evaluated not only as wise or foolish, but in terms of some notion
of "correctness" or "appropriateness" within the prevailing rule
system.
The legislative theorists would counter that these supposed
unique judicial considerations do not constrain judicial choices at all,
but merely determine the form and style in which they are expressed.
The judge, like the legislator, first decides what the best rule is, and
simply writes it in an opinion rather than a statute.
What we have then are two differing empirical accounts of what
it is that judges do when deciding cases that are not controlled by
16 Frank, supra note 2, at 655-56.
,.
j» r
11 See H. Hart & A. Sachs, The Legal Process; Basic Problems in the Making and Applica
tion of Law (tent. ed. 1958).
18 See R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986).
1' They all agree that when authoritative legal materials run out, the judge does not simply
choose the rule she thinks will be "best" in light of all the competing societal considerations,
but rather applies a uniquely judicial mode of arriving at the appropriate result. True, the
intuitionists are never particularly clear on what this unique judicial mode of decisionmaking
is and it takes rather different forms in the works of the different scholars on the intuitiomst
side of this grand dichotomy. For Hutcheson and Frank, it is just a hunch, an intuition, which
remains mysterious and unanalyzable. See Frank, supra note 2, at 655-56; Hutcheson, supra
note 3. For Hart and Sachs, it is a certain psychological attitude toward judging, an openness
and neutrality with respect to opposing positions. For Dworkin, at l^t in his n^t i^nt
formulation in Law's Empire, it is a shared involvement in an interpretive project. See Dwor
kin, Law's Empire (1986).
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authoritative legal materials. The legislators claim that under such
circumstances, the judge freely chooses that rule which he or she indi
vidually determines best serves the needs and welfare of society. The
intuitionists claim that the judge, acting as judge, can make no such
free and individual choice, but is always constrained and limited by
considerations unique to the judicial role.
Put this way, these diflfering accounts of the judicial process ap
pear to be empirically testable, at least insofar as the judge's percep
tion of his or her own decisionmaking process is thought to provide
evidence of that process. The legislative model implies that judges, at
least in some class of cases, feel themselves free to make whatever
decision is in the best interests of society, based on their own percep
tion of society's interests. The intuitionist model, by contrast, sug
gests that judges should feel, even in cases not controlled by
authoritative legal materials, a push or constraint causally related to
his or her understanding of the legal rule structure which, while not
necessarily dispositive, limits or pushes the decisionmaking process in
a certain direction.
III.

JUSTICE BRENNAN'S LEGAL TRADITION

Which of these models, then, constitutes the view of judging set
forth by Justice Brennan? The legal world Justice Brennan describes
seems, at first blush, to bear far more resemblance to that of the intui
tionists than that of the legislative theorists. Justice Brennan never
describes himself as facing a judicial tabula rasa, a legal question in
which authoritative legal materials have "run out" and he is free to
decide whatever way he likes. Quite the contrary. Justice Brennan
tells us that the world is not merely full, but overflowing with legal
authority. Every time a litigant asserts a claim of due process, that
litigant invokes a legal tradition deeply rooted in Anglo-American
law. Justice Brennan makes it clear that in ruling on claims of due
process, even novel claims not controlled by prior due process deci
sions, he, as a judge, must take into account that due process tradi
tion; the historical form it has taken; and the way that tradition
relates to, and will be affected by, the particular decision he is called
upon to make in each case. Justice Brennan tells us that authoritative
legal materials can have causal influence even when operating at very
high levels of generality. The more fundamental and pervasive a rule
is in our legal culture, the more real are its "penumbras" or "emana
tions" (those curious mystical phrases that enliven constitutional law)
in that they continue to influence the thinking of judges, even after the
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judge realizes that prior interpretations of the rule are not dispositive
of the issue in the present case.
Justice Brennan, unlike the legislative theorists, does not view
these general due process concepts as simply vague rhetorical formu
las that may be invoked with equal validity and likelihood of success
by either side in a due process argument. Rather, he sees them as
carrying real weight, as lending credence to certain arguments that
invoke the tradition in appropriate ways, and as weakening or dis
crediting other arguments that utilize a concept of due process which,
while formally consistent with prior precedent, may nonetheless be
inconsistent with the broader understanding of that concept dominant
in the legal community and in the mind of the judge. Justice Brennan
recognizes, of course, that the dominant understanding of these tradi
tions can and will change over time, but that this does not negate the
fact that, at any given time, a dominant conception will render vari
ous arguments about the due process clause "stronger" or "weaker"
even in the absence of controlling precedent.
Thus far, Justice Brennan's views seem in hne with the intuitionist account of the judicial process. He agrees that, even when there is
no controlling precedent, there is "law" in the form of vaguer and
more general legal traditions or concepts, which still enter into the
uniquely judicial form of decisionmaking in a way legislators do not
experience. Justice Brennan departs from the intuitionist model,
however, by also presenting us with a picture of the judge as an indi
vidual, experiencing and sometimes struggling with the legal tradi
tions under which he or she is operating and looking for ways to
judge, evaluate, and critique them. This judge looks more like that of
the legislative model, a strong-willed social critic who can, and does,
shape the law in accordance with his or her independent social vision.
But unlike the judge envisioned by the legislative model, who is sim
ply free to make the law when authority runs out. Justice Brennan's
judge must work to attain the freedom to change the law, must work
to alter the dominant understandings so as to comport more closely
with his or her individual conception of social justice.
Since Justice Brennan's legal world is filled with prevailing tradi
tions and conceptions which push judicial outcomes in certain direc
tions, he must, if he seeks to move the law in a different direction,
confront and deal with those traditions. It is here that Justice Bren
nan invokes "passion" to counteract the claims of "reason," but his
conception of passion is not irrational or anti-rational; it is simply a
perspective of the world that is outside prevailing legal categories.
For Justice Brennan, the dominant legal categories and traditional us-
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ages are the conventional modes of legal "reason," and to go outside
those categories involves exercising "passion."
The availability of these outside perspectives may make it seem
that the judicial process is simply a matter of technique or craft, of
finding the perspectives that permit one either to preserve or alter the
dominant conception. Obviously, there is a large element of tech
nique or craft in legal advocacy, and a judge, particularly an appellate
court judge, must exercise such advocacy skills frequently. But when
Justice Brennan describes that effort involved in applying passion to
legal reasoning, he is speaking of more than just effective advocacy.
He is speaking of convincing himself. "Passion" for Justice Brennan,
seems to involve a broadening of one's own perspective, a way of look
ing at legal questions from outside traditional legal categories. Some
times these perspectives reveal to him the inadequacies of the
traditional legal categories, providing powerful arguments for change.
Sometimes they do not.
Justice Brennan's discussion of Goldberg v. Kelly nicely illus
trates many of these themes. The case was one of first impression, in
that the Court had never before ruled on whether a hearing was re
quired before benefits to a welfare recipient could be terminated. Yet
Justice Brennan does not approach the problem as a legislator, weigh
ing the costs and benefits of holding such hearings, or even asking
such basic questions as whether the preexisting system led to substan
tial numbers of improper terminations. Rather, he views the appro
priate inquiry as a legal question, involving the scope and application
of the due process clause. His inquiry is accordingly directed at deter
mining how the due process clause affects this issue, not at simply
determining what the best social policy is.
Having determined that the case must be decided by some analy
sis or interpretation of the legal meaning of due process. Justice Bren
nan then confronts the standard Realist dilemma. Perfectly plausible
arguments can be made, based on well-established due process princi
ples, both in favor of and against the requirement of a pretermination
hearing. Certainly it is consistent with well-established due process
notions to argue that formal trial-type procedures should be instituted
before the state terminates a "property" interest consisting of a well
founded expectation of future benefit payments. Such an argument,
utilizing preexisting categories of due process analysis and seeking, by
reasonable analogy to prior cases, to expand the boundaries of such
categories, seems to Justice Brennan a "rational" argument.
20 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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By the same token, however, the dominant imderstanding of the
due process clause, as set forth in prior cases, was that it did not al
ways require a trial-type hearing prior to a taking, as long as the state
had maintained other adequate safeguards against arbitrary action.
Justice Brennan points out that, in Goldberg, the seven-day notice
provision, right to submit a written statement, review procedures, and
right to a post-termination hearing, could well have been considered
to provide such adequate safeguards. Indeed, when coupled with the
standard judicial reticence to overturn state procedures, particularly
on constitutional grounds. Justice Brennan strongly hints that this
would have been a winning argument, as long as the advocate stayed
within preexisting legal categories.
Notice that this account thus far parallels, in many ways, intuitionist claims about judicial decisionmaking. Even though the deci
sion is not controlled by prior precedent, the terms of the dispute are
shaped by it, and the judge, by close attention to the argument, devel
ops a sense as to which is the "stronger" or more appropriate applica
tion of preexisting due process concepts to the case at hand.
But the Court in Goldberg did not rule that the notice provision,
the post-termination hearing and the other procedures provided ade
quate safeguards. And, Justice Brennan tells us, it did not rule that
way beca\ise the Court was made aware of the "drastic consequences
of terminating a recipient's only means of subsistence."^' The argu
ment was not that termination of welfare benefits was like other tak
ings of property, but that it was different, in that an individual
deprived of basic requirements of subsistence was unlikely to pursue
post-termination remedies, no matter how adequate under traditional
due process standards. Thus, the argument that persuaded the Court
(and presumably persuaded Justice Brennan as well) was not one that
simply invoked preexisting legal categories, but one that functioned
simultaneously as both a critique and an application of preexisting
due process concepts.
The decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, as Justice Brennan presents it,
was neither required by preexisting authority, nor created by legislat
ing jurists. Rather, it was the result of a unique form of judicial work:
the effort to reconcile legal categories and concepts, which all legal
actors use to make sense of legal questions, with the broader set of
facts, beliefs, information, and generalizations that we all use to make
sense of the world. In Goldberg, certain facts about the nature of wel
fare and welfare recipients were used to undermine and alter prevail21 Brennan, Reason, Passion and "The Progress of the Law," 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 3, 20
(1988).
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ing legal understandings of due process. Yet in other situations, as
Justice Brennan tells us, new facts and alternative perspectives may
not be able to alter prevailing legal understandings. This process of
seeking to convince and persuade is itself one in which outcomes can
not be fully predicted.^^
CONCLUSION
Justice Brennan's essay does not seek to provide a theory of judi
cial decisionmaking, and although I have sought to generalize on the
basis of his insights, I do not mean to turn it into one. The essay is far
more rare and valuable as one judge's account of what the actual ex
perience of the decisionmaking process is like. It reminds us of the
difficulty any theory has of capturing the complexity of human experi
ence. Nonetheless, it is only through categorizing and generalizing
about human experience that we can talk about, study, and thereby
aggregate our insights into the nature of our shared experience. Jus
tice Brennan's essay suggests that legal authorities may also function
as a set of generalized attitudes and conceptions that provide coher
ence and insight about the world of social relations, but that never
fully capture the complexity of that world. Accordingly, the legal
system always remains open to critique or change by fresh insights or
perspectives from that larger social world that the preexisting legal
structure failed to fully capture or appreciate.
For Justice Brennan, the mechanism for such change is the deci
sionmaking process of the judge himself or herself, who, although
trained and inculcated with the prevailing legal categories and con
ceptions, must also remain open to arguments based on differing per
spectives that reveal aspects of social reality not dealt with by
prevailing legal concepts. Such a judge is, in some respects, like an
artist simultaneously interpreting and expanding a particular artistic
tradition, and in some respects, like a scientist, always open to revi
sion of his or her theoretical presuppositions in the face of new data.
Nonetheless, as Justice Brennan makes eminently clear, such a judge
also possesses a kind of skill and imagination that is unique to the
judicial craft.
22 Cf. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice 48 (1971). Rawls' idea of "reflective equilibrium"
describes a process whereby one's intuitive and nonreflective decision about a set of facts is
subsequently modified and justified by theoretical and structural deliberation of legal princi
ples, ultimately resulting in a satisfactory judicial decision. See also Kennedy, supra note 7
(describing a process of squaring intuition with legal principle).

